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OPINION   
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
What is the duty of a real estate title insurer in 
Pennsylvania to defend the insured party (here the successor to 
a lender) against claims of the borrower/mortgagor?  Its courts, 
we predict, would not apply the “in for one, in for all” rule 
(known also as the complete defense rule)1—whereby a single 
covered claim triggers an obligation for the title insurer to 
defend the entire action—to a case about that insurer’s duty to 
defend.  To identify a covered claim, we apply Pennsylvania’s 
rule that potentially covered claims are identified by 
“comparing the four corners of the insurance contract to the 
four corners of the complaint.” American & Foreign Ins. Co. 
v. Jerry’s Sport Center, Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541 (Pa. 2010). 
I. Background 
                                              
1 The insured in its briefing used the latter term.  As both the 
District Court and the title insurer refer to the rule by its more 
colloquial name, we do as well. 
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A. Adrian Lupu’s Refinance Loan and Mortgage 
Adrian Lupu, at the time a Pennsylvania homeowner, 
refinanced his home loan and mortgage with Loan City, LLC.  
It soon transferred both to IndyMac Bank, FSB, then they went 
to Fannie Mae, next to OneWest Bank, FSB, and finally to the 
current holder, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.  Stewart Title 
Guaranty Company provided title insurance.  After defaulting, 
Lupu sued to void the instruments evidencing his debt, the 
District Court ultimately dismissed his action, and he did not 
file an appeal.  Lupu is not a party to this dispute about who 
must pay the fees and costs of Ocwen incurred in defending his 
claims.  Nonetheless we need to flesh out the facts underlying 
the issues before us.      
Lupu’s action challenged, among other things, the use 
of the MERS System, a private mortgage registry that allows 
its members to avoid the need for cumbersome county-level 
public recordation when transferring mortgage interests.  
Members do so by designating Mortgage Electronic 
Registrations Services, Inc., an entity acting as an 
intermediary, as the holder of record for their mortgages.  
Although MERS is named as the mortgagee, it does so only as 
its members’ nominee and not as the actual owner; the 
members retain the beneficial interests in the mortgages.  As a 
result, the members can transfer mortgage interests among 
themselves without the need to record the assignments.  The 
MERS System tracks those transactions electronically.  
Because Loan City used the MERS System, the mortgage on 
Lupu’s home and real property identified MERS as the 
mortgagee of record.  Despite Lupu’s challenge to the validity 
of the system, the use of this streamlined recording method is 
generally in accord with Pennsylvania law.  Montgomery Cty., 
Pa. v. MERSCORP Inc., 795 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2015).    
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If a MERS System member sells a mortgage to a non-
member, the mortgage must quit the MERS System by a direct 
mortgage assignment to the buyer.  The transfers from Loan 
City to IndyMac Bank, and by it to Fannie Mae, all members, 
were made on the system with MERS remaining the locally 
recorded mortgage holder.  But OneWest Bank is not a 
member, so it received and recorded a mortgage assignment 
from MERS.  OneWest, in turn, sold the mortgage to Ocwen 
Loan Servicing, also a non-member, by recorded assignment.  
The Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Chester County, 
Pennsylvania has the documents for these last transactions.   
B. The Title Insurance Policy 
In connection with Lupu’s refinance transaction, 
Stewart Title insured to Loan City, along with its successors 
and assignees, the record title of the property (hereafter 
referred to as the “Title Policy”).  It covered against “loss or 
damage” resulting from, among other things: 
1.  Title to the estate or interest 
described in Schedule A being 
vested other than as stated therein; 
2.  Any defect in or lien or 
encumbrances to the title; 
3.  Unmarketability of the title; 
*     *     * 
5.  The invalidity or unenforceability 
of the lien of the insured mortgage 
upon the title; 
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6.  The priority of any lien or 
encumbrance over the lien of the 
insured mortgage; 
*     *     * 
9.  The invalidity or unenforceability 
of any assignment of the Insured 
Mortgage, provided the 
assignment is shown in Schedule 
A, or the failure of the assignment 
shown in Schedule A to vest title 
to the Insured Mortgage in the 
named Insured assignee free and 
clear of all liens; [and] 
*     *     * 
22.  Forgery after Date of Policy of any 
assignment, release or 
reconveyance (partial or full) of 
the Insured Mortgage. 
Schedule A, to which coverage provisions (1) and (9) refer, 
describes the property as vesting in “ADRIAN LUPU, AS 
SOLE OWNER[.]”     
 For covered claims, the Title Policy requires Stewart 
Title to “pay the costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred 
in defense of the title or the lien of the Insured Mortgage, as 
insured, but only to the extent provided in the Conditions and 
Stipulations.”  Those Conditions and Stipulations state that 
Stewart Title will defend only “those stated causes of action . . 
. insured against by this policy[]” and not “those causes of 
action which allege matters not insured against by this policy.”   
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C. Lupu’s Lawsuit  
 After defaulting on his loan obligations, Lupu filed a 
pro se Complaint to Quiet Title in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Chester County.  He named Loan City, MERS, Fannie Mae, 
and some John Does as defendants, but he only served Loan 
City with the Complaint.  When it did not respond, Lupu 
moved for and received a default judgment against the entity.  
However, Loan City had by then transferred the mortgage to 
OneWest Bank by a recorded assignment.  After the transfer, 
Lupu filed a First Amended Complaint, dropping Fannie Mae 
and MERS as defendants and adding OneWest.  It removed the 
case to federal court (the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) 
based on diversity of citizenship.   
   Once there, Lupu filed a Second Amended Complaint.  
Among other things, it alleged that: MERS had been used to 
“thwart” and “circumvent” Pennsylvania’s recording laws, 
making the loan contract “illegal” and “unenforceable;”  the 
unrecorded mortgage loan assignments were improper, thus 
breaking “the chain of title,”  as MERS is merely “an electronic 
recording entity” and cannot execute an assignment; Loan City 
fraudulently induced him into the mortgage and loan 
transaction by failing to inform him that it would transfer the 
loan and assign the mortgage; and using MERS (instead of the 
local office of the Recorder of Deeds) to track the mortgage 
assignments in Pennsylvania was a violation of the 
Commonwealth’s compulsory recording laws and constituted 
a forgery and fraudulent practice.   
OneWest Bank moved for summary judgment, and, in 
response, Lupu moved to file a Third Amended Complaint, 
which the Court granted in part to allow three claims.  The first 
sought enforcement against OneWest, as Loan City’s 
successor, of the default judgment against Loan City on Lupu’s 
initial state-court complaint.  The second claim renewed his 
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objections about MERS being used to skirt the recording laws 
and the unrecorded transfers breaking the chain of title; in 
effect, MERS was not the mortgagee and thus did not have the 
legal “capacity to assign the [m]ortgage” to OneWest.  The 
third claim reasserted Lupu’s contention that the use of MERS 
violates Pennsylvania law.  OneWest again moved for 
summary judgment.     
Meanwhile, outside of the Complaint, a new allegation 
began taking shape.  Lupu, now with counsel, responded to 
interrogatories by asserting that “[t]he original Mortgage  
. . . signed in front of the Pennsylvania Notary contained 
signatures of Adrian Lupu and [his wife]2 and was never 
recorded.”  Lupu claimed Loan City created mortgage 
documents using a different notary that had only his signature.  
He filed his own motion for summary judgment, and, to meet 
his burden of proof, submitted a certification stating that “the 
‘recorded mortgage’ to MERS/OneWest is not the ‘original 
mortgage’ . . . Mr. Lupu and his wife signed at closing.” 
Considering the Third Amended Complaint, the District 
Court denied OneWest Bank/Ocwen Loan Servicing’s 
summary judgment motion (the servicer had by then taken the 
bank’s interest in the mortgage).  The Court explained, 
however, that the “only claim remaining in the case” involved 
Lupu’s challenge to “the legitimacy of the recorded 
mortgage[.]”  The lawsuit survived because Lupu’s statement 
in the affidavit raised a factual issue by creating the possibility 
that Lupu was seeking a “constructive” amendment to the 
                                              
2 As it turns out, Lupu’s fiancée signed the mortgage though 
record title was only in Lupu’s name.  In any event, the Title 
Policy states Mr. Lupu is the property’s sole owner, and the 
refinance note was signed only by him. 
9 
 
Complaint even though its “language . . . did not specifically 
allege that the mortgage was forged[.]”   
    It didn’t end here.  Lupu brought a Fourth Amended 
Complaint that added Ocwen and Stewart Title as defendants 
and deleted OneWest.  In the facts section he made the forgery 
allegation to which he had previously referred.  He claimed that 
Loan City created, notarized, and recorded forged mortgage 
documents “using a different notary from Silver Spring[], 
[Maryland,] having only Mr. Lupu’s signature,” and that the 
original mortgage, therefore, could not have been assigned by 
Loan City to MERS or ultimately to Ocwen. Among other 
things, Lupu re-asserted his claim that the unrecorded transfers 
(using the MERS System) had broken the chain of title.  He 
also sought money damages and entry of default on the ground 
that Loan City did not timely answer the state court complaint 
before removal.  He sought money damages as well stemming 
from his allegations that the assignments of his mortgage to, 
among others, Ocwen were voidable because MERS and the 
others could not assign it as a result of their lack of authority.  
Finally, he claimed the failure to disclose the intent to transfer 
his loan was fraud by deception and clouded the title to his 
property.  Hence Lupu sought, inter alia, an order to quiet title 
and to bar Ocwen from asserting any lien on the mortgaged 
property.     
The District Court found Lupu’s allegations 
unsubstantiated and dismissed with prejudice all of his claims.  
Lupu v. Loan City, LLC, 244 F. Supp. 3d 455, 463 (E.D. Pa. 
2017).  Lupu did not appeal the ruling. 
D. Ocwen’s Third-Party Complaint Seeking 
Insurance Coverage from Stewart Title 
And still the matter was not over.  After Ocwen moved 
for summary judgment on Lupu’s Third Amended Complaint, 
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it sought defense coverage by Stewart Title.  Ocwen’s counsel 
wrote to Stewart Title that Lupu was pressing a covered claim 
“to avoid the mortgage on the basis that it was not executed 
and witnessed correctly.”  Stewart Title responded that 
“Lupu’s arguments concerned the securitization of the note 
secured by the insured mortgage and the validity of 
assignments of the insured mortgage rather than the execution 
and witnessing of the insured mortgage itself.”  Ocwen’s 
counsel conceded as much, writing, “We took another look at 
the Complaint.  We agree regarding the allegation of the 
Complaint.”  However, the lawyer told Stewart Title he 
believed, “based on the interrogatories and the recent 
communication from the borrower (through counsel) before 
our filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, it is more 
likely than not that [the issue of avoiding the mortgage] will be 
raised in short order.”   
  Lupu then submitted an affidavit alleging the initial 
lender forged the recorded mortgage, and the Court, while 
denying the motion for summary judgment, indicated that the 
only issue remaining was that of the mortgage’s legitimacy.  In 
light of this, Ocwen pressed with greater urgency its demand 
to Stewart Title that the insurer provide a defense, cure the 
purported title defect, and pay Ocwen for its expenses.  But 
Stewart Title, in a letter to Ocwen, formally denied the claim 
on the ground that, because “Lupu has not yet alleged the 
matter in the Complaint,” there were no claims “requiring a 
defense by Stewart Title pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of the Policy.”   
In response, Ocwen filed a Third-Party Complaint 
against Stewart Title alleging breach of contract and bad faith 
denial of coverage.  Stewart Title moved to dismiss, asserting 
that in Pennsylvania coverage determinations must be entirely 
based on claims within the “four corners” of the complaint, and 
the Third Amended Complaint did not allege the mortgage was 
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invalid because of forgery.  The District Court denied the 
motion, as it believed that at least one of the claims made in the 
Third Amended Complaint potentially was covered by the 
Title Policy. 
Lupu then filed the Fourth Amended Complaint, 
making the forgery allegations that he had earlier referenced, 
and Ocwen again requested Stewart Title’s defense.  This time 
Stewart Title agreed to defend Ocwen, but only for the count 
that claimed the purported deception and fraud clouded Lupu’s 
property’s title.     
Stewart Title and Ocwen each moved for summary 
judgment.  In Ocwen’s cross-motion the company argued that 
the Title Policy covers the allegations in the Third and Fourth 
Amended Complaints.  Alternatively, it asserted that even if 
the Title Policy did not cover other counts of the Fourth 
Amended Complaint, Stewart Title had a duty to defend 
Ocwen until there were no potentially covered claims 
remaining in the case.   
Considering the cross-motions, the District Court 
applied the “four corners” rule and held that Stewart Title had 
no duty to defend the claims in the Third Amended Complaint, 
but as to the Fourth Amended Complaint applied the “in for 
one, in for all” rule to hold that, because the title company had 
a duty to defend against one claim, it had a duty under 
Pennsylvania law to defend all of the claims in that Complaint.  
Lupu, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 465-66. 
Stewart Title and Ocwen both appealed.  The latter  
contests the Court’s application of the “four corners” rule to 
conclude Stewart Title had no duty to defend the claims in the 
Third Amended Complaint, and Stewart Title challenges the 
Court’s application of the “in for one, in for all” rule to find it 
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owed a duty to defend the Fourth Amended Complaint in its 
entirety.  
II. Standard of Review 
As noted, the District Court had diversity jurisdiction 28 
U.S.C § 1332.  Our jurisdiction is through 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We review de novo a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(en banc).  It is proper if there is no genuine dispute issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 
760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018).  “In conducting our review, we view 
the record in the light most favorable to [the non-movant] and 
draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.”  Nicini, 212 F.3d  
at 805-06. 
We also determine the applicable state law anew.  
Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 154, 162 (3d. Cir. 
2011).   
In the absence of a definitive ruling by a state's 
highest court, we must predict how that court 
would rule if faced with the issue.  In so doing, 
we must look to decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting 
that state's law, and of other state supreme courts 
that have addressed the issue, as well as to 
analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly 
works, and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in 
the state would decide the issue at hand.  
Id. at 164 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
III. Discussion 
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A. In Pennsylvania, an insurer’s duty to defend 
can be triggered only by an allegation within 
the four corners of the complaint. 
 “[T]he rule everywhere is that the obligation of a 
causualty [sic] insurance company to defend an action brought 
against the insured is to be determined solely by the allegations 
of the complaint in the action[.]”  Wilson v. Md. Cas. Co., 105 
A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. 1954).  With this method, the “question of 
whether a claim against an insured is potentially covered is 
answered by comparing the four corners of the insurance 
contract to the four corners of the complaint.”  Jerry's Sport 
Center, 2 A.3d at 541.  This so-called “four corners” rule is 
about administrative ease; it ensures courts can “efficiently 
determine an insurer's duty to defend, which results in less 
distraction from the merits of the underlying suit.”  Water Well 
Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins. Co., 881 N.W.2d 285, 295 
(Wis. 2016).  It is also based on the terms of the insurance 
contract because it does not allow courts to “rewrite the 
contractual duty to defend to be triggered whenever any claim 
is made rather than only those claims covered under the actual 
policy terms.”  Id. at 295 n.15 (emphasis in original).          
Yet the inflexible application the “four corners” rule 
allows an insurer to plead Sergeant Schultz’s “know nothing” 
defense, and “thereby successfully ignor[e] true but unpleaded 
facts within its knowledge that require it, under the insurance 
policy, to conduct the putative insured’s defense.”  Associated 
Indem. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 386 N.E.2d 529, 536 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1979) (footnote omitted).  As a consequence, courts in a 
majority of states have departed from the “four corners” rule in 
cases where the insurer knows or should know the allegations 
in the complaint conflict with the facts on the ground.  Water 
Well Sols., 881 N.W.2d at 304 (Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases from 31 states recognizing the exception).  
The position is that “the insurer cannot use a third party’s 
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pleadings as a shield to avoid its contractual duty to defend its 
insured.”  Fitzpatrick v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 
90 (N.Y. 1991) (citation omitted).  After all, these courts 
contend, “the duty to defend derives, in the first instance, not 
from the complaint drafted by a third party, but rather from the 
insurer’s own contract with the insured.”  Id.  The alternative 
approach, it is said, “allows a litigant who is not a party to a 
contract of insurance to unilaterally control whether . . . the 
policy provides coverage when that litigant has no privity in 
the contract.”  Water Well Sols., 881 N.W.2d at 304 (Bradley, 
dissenting) (quoting Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp. Inc. v. Consol. 
Ins. Co., 871 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (Reilly, 
P.J., dissenting)).   
Against the tide of this consensus, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in 2006 declined to adopt an exception to the 
“four corners” rule.  In Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., 
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006), 
the manufacturer of a coke oven battery was sued for breach of 
contract and/or breach of warranty because the ovens had 
become cracked, displaced, sheared, and shattered.  The 
manufacturer submitted a claim to its insurer under a 
commercial liability policy covering “accidents,” which in 
Pennsylvania involve unexpected events.  Id. at 898.  The 
insurer denied coverage for the faulty workmanship-based 
claim, the manufacturer sought a declaratory judgment 
compelling coverage, and the insurer moved for summary 
judgment.  Id. at 891-92.  In its opposition to the motion, the 
manufacturer introduced expert reports opining that heavy 
rains caused the damage—making it a would-be “accident.”  
Id. at 892-93.  On appeal from the trial court, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court found the information from the expert report 
established a genuine issue of material fact precluding 
summary judgment.  Id. at 894.   
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In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Kvaerner argued 
an exception to the “four corners” rule was more protective of 
policyholders, discouraged artful pleading in the modern 
“notice” pleading era, and many jurisdictions had adopted it.  
Brief for Appellees at 61-62, Kvaerner (Nos. 47 MAP 2004, 
48 MAP 2004), 2004 WL 2615701.  But the Supreme Court 
was not persuaded and held that the Superior Court erred by 
looking to the expert reports offered by the putative insured 
rather than studying only the complaint.  In doing so, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the duty to defend is determined 
“solely by the allegations of the complaint.”  Kvaerner, 908 
A.2d at 896 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wilson, 105 A.2d 
at 307).   
We have repeatedly recognized and applied this well-
established precedent.  See, e.g., Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. 
Co., 814 F.3d 660, 673 (3d Cir. 2016); Hanover Ins. Co. v. 
Urban Outfitters, Inc., 806 F. 3d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Moreover, “Pennsylvania courts have identified no exception 
to the time-honored rule . . . in Kvaerner.”  Burchick Constr. 
Co., Inc., v. Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co., No. 1051 WDA 
2012, 2014 WL 10965436, at *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) 
(unpublished).  Legal commentators concur.  For instance, one 
source counts Pennsylvania among the states in which “the 
answer is simple—No.  Courts are not permitted to consider 
extrinsic evidence[.]”  Randy Maniloff & Jeffrey Stempel, 
General Liability Insurance Coverage: Key Issues In Every 
State 69-74, 89 (1st ed. 2011).      
Does Kvaerner foreclose reliance on the outside facts 
introduced in the underlying litigation by Lupu, the third-party 
plaintiff, rather than by the putative insured (Ocwen)?  If it 
does, that is the end of the matter; if it does not, we must predict 
whether it would—and do no more, as to change 
Pennsylvania’s existing law transcends our purposes.  We 
conclude that Kvaerner’s unequivocal holding leaves no room 
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for such a distinction.  Indeed, although the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was invited to make an exception to the “four 
corners” rule, it flatly declined, finding “no reason to expand 
upon the well-reasoned and long-standing rule that 
an insurer’s duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual 
averments contained in the complaint itself.”  Kvaerner, 908 
A.2d at 896. We thus honor its decision to maintain a simple, 
bright-line rule. 
There is a misfit case—that Ocwen claims is the 
controlling law—we must address.  Curiously, twenty-some 
years before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided 
Kvaerner, the Superior Court recognized an exception to the 
“four corners” rule that fits the case before us.  In that case, 
Heffernan & Co. v. Hartford Insurance Co. of America, 614 
A.2d 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), Heffernan sought insurance 
coverage for a negligent construction claim against it after a 
gymnasium roof it built collapsed.  Id. at 296.  The complaint 
alleged only damage to the building, which the policy did not 
cover.  However, in response to interrogatories, the third-party 
plaintiff listed damages to the building’s contents for which 
there would be coverage.  Id.  In a declaratory action following 
the insurer’s denial of coverage, the Superior Court held that 
the information in the interrogatories triggered the duty to 
defend even though the complaint had not yet been amended 
to include them.  It explained, “Both Heffernan and Hartford 
are now on notice that a claim for damage to the contents of 
the building will probably be made in the underlying action.  If 
that occurs, coverage will become clear.”  Id. at 298.  It said no 
more about its holding that knowledge of the likelihood of a 
covered claim triggers the duty to defend.   
What are we to make of this anomalous case?  While we 
must “give due regard” to state intermediate appellate courts, 
we can be “convinced by other persuasive data that the 
[Pennsylvania Supreme Court] would decide otherwise.”  
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Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Accordingly, we will not look to Heffernan as an indication of 
how the Supreme Court would decide the case before us today.  
The decision stands practically alone in Pennsylvania; to our 
knowledge, it is joined only by two unpublished Superior 
Court opinions.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
explicitly overturned the case.  However, because it never 
appended to the “four-corners” rule Heffernan’s exception, it 
is not the law in the Commonwealth.   As there is a conflict 
between Kvaerner and Heffernan, Kvaerner controls, and we 
must follow it.     
Finally, Ocwen complains of the harsh consequences 
that can be wrought by the “four corners” rule, and no doubt a 
wooden application leaves would-be insureds in the lurch if a 
covered claim is not identifiable in the complaint.  But 
Pennsylvania courts tolerate this measure of concern in 
exchange for a clear rule’s benefit.  “Put another way, in 
Kvaerner, as in this case, the party seeking insurance was left 
at the mercy of the [manner] in which the underlying plaintiff 
opted to pursue its claim.”  Burchick, 2014 WL 10965436, at 
*8.  Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently 
done so for other insureds, we too meet Ocwen’s “prayer for 
relief, however sympathetic, with unflinching fidelity to the 
traditional rule.”  Id.   
In sum, per Kvaerner, the seminal case on the issue, we 
may not look for a covered claim beyond the four corners of 
Lupu’s complaint and how it matches up with the actual terms 
of the Title Policy.  This dispute centers on the Third and 
Fourth Amended Complaints, to which we turn.  
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B. Stewart Title’s duty to defend arose after 
Lupu filed the Fourth Amended Complaint. 
Ocwen earlier acknowledged in correspondence with 
Stewart Title that there were no covered claims on the face of 
the Third Amended Complaint.  The company now argues to 
the contrary.  We agree with the District Court that the Third 
Amended Complaint, which challenged the MERS System and 
the post-closing mortgage transfers, does not present any claim 
under the Title Policy, which generally covers claims that the 
original mortgage is invalid or forged.    
Ocwen contends the insurance provision covering 
“[f]orgeries after the date of Policy of any assignment . . . of 
the Insured Mortgage” was triggered by Lupu’s calling the 
mortgage, as assigned, “illegitimate,” a “false business 
record,” and a “forgery.”  But the nature of the factual 
allegations and claims, not the precise words used, determines 
whether a duty to defend is triggered.  Roman Mosaic & Tile 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 A.2d 665, 668 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997).  Despite Lupu’s use of those words, the Third 
Amended Complaint does not allege a “forgery” of the original 
mortgage as the parties could have understood that term.  
Rather, Lupu attacked the well-settled law upholding the 
practices associated with MERS involvement in the mortgage 
market.  He contended that only the actual holder (and not 
MERS, the placeholder) could execute an assignment.  He 
challenged the legitimacy of assignments and transfers of the 
mortgage by MERS because it only acted as “nominee” and 
was never the actual holder of the mortgage.  There is no 
allegation that an assignment of the mortgage was executed 
without proper authority or a genuine signature, so there is no 
forgery claim as to the assignment in the Third Amended 
Complaint.  See Forgery, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 
2014).   
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Nor does that Complaint allege a claim that the original 
mortgage is invalid, which would be covered by the Title 
Policy.  Ocwen points to Lupu’s prayer for relief.  To remedy 
the allegedly broken chain of title, Lupu asked the District 
Court to revoke the mortgage and quiet title.  Ocwen asks us to 
construe this prayer as a claim that the original mortgage itself 
was rendered invalid by the subsequent MERS-assignments, 
however implausible that scenario is.  But in Pennsylvania “the 
particular cause of action that a complaint pleads is not 
determinative of whether coverage has been triggered.  Instead, 
it is necessary to look at the factual allegations contained in the 
complaint.”  Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745 
(Pa. 1999).  This avoids “the use of artful pleadings designed 
to avoid exclusions in liability insurance policies.”  Id.  A 
prayer for relief is not a factual allegation, and Lupu did not 
plead any facts alleging the invalidity of the original mortgage, 
so no duty to defend arose.  To hold otherwise would involve 
Stewart Title in defending underlying claims that had nothing 
to do with the Title Policy.  
The duty to defend arose when Lupu filed the Fourth 
Amended Complaint, including there the forgery allegations he 
had referred to earlier in response to interrogatories.  After 
Lupu filed the Fourth Amended Complaint, Stewart Title 
agreed to provide a  partial defense and retained counsel.  What 
is left to consider is whether it needed to defend Ocwen against 
the entire Complaint.          
C. In Pennsylvania, the “in for one, in for all” 
rule does not apply to cases involving title 
insurance policies. 
Does the “in for one, in for all” rule apply to all aspects 
of Ocwen’s defense to Lupu’s Fourth Amended Complaint 
once Stewart Title agreed to defend Ocwen partially?  This 
issue turns on the difference between title insurance and 
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general liability insurance.  “Title insurance is the business of 
insuring the record title of real property for persons with some 
interest in the estate, including owners, occupiers, and 
lenders.” F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 625 
(1992).  It is limited, as the “sole object of title insurance is to 
cover possibilities of loss through defects that may cloud or 
invalidate titles.” Foehrenbach v. German-Am. Title & Tr. Co., 
66 A. 561, 563 (Pa. 1907).  It is backward-looking, as the 
insurer can reduce its exposure to loss before the issuance of 
the policy by searching the public records.  By contrast, general 
liability insurance looks forward, as it typically insures against 
injury occurring because of a future “accident.”  See, e.g., 
Lords Landing Vill. Condo. Council of Unit Owners v. Cont'l 
Ins. Co., 520 U.S. 893, 894 (1997); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. CPB Int'l, Inc., 562 F.3d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 2009); Kvaerner, 
908 A.2d at 897.  
“There is no dispute that, on its face, the Title Policy 
disclaims a duty . . . to defend non-covered claims.”  Ocwen’s 
Br. at 25.  It limits the duty to defend “to those stated causes of 
action . . . insured against by this policy.”  Generally, an 
insurance policy’s plain meaning controls.  Donegal Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 2007).  
However, if the disclaimer of duty is contrary to public policy, 
it is not enforceable in Pennsylvania.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Riley, 352 F.3d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 2003); Eichelman v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1998). 
Public policy should seldom be used to upset 
contractual expectations.  As such, Pennsylvania courts are  
“reluctant to invalidate a contractual provision due to public 
policy concerns.”  Williams, 32 A.3d at 1200.  Put another way, 
they are “cautious” in light of “the often formless face of public 
policy.”  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 813 A.2d 
747, 752 (Pa. 2002).  They act “only when a given policy is so 
obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or 
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welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion[.]”  Mamlin 
v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941).         
“Public policy is . . . ascertained by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interest.”  Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 
A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 
324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945)).   To support its public-policy 
argument, Ocwen points to the “in for one, in for all” rule 
developed by the common law, which, to repeat, requires an 
insurer to defend the insured in the entire lawsuit where one 
claim is within the scope of the coverage even though other 
claims are not.  See Jerry’s Sport Center, 948 A.2d at 845.  By 
preventing insurers from breaking a case into covered and non-
covered pieces, courts avoid the potential waste and 
impracticality of a bifurcated defense.     
No published opinion in Pennsylvania has applied the 
rule when a title insurance policy is at issue.  See Ocwen’s Br. 
at 26-27 (not contesting the point).   Commonwealth courts 
have only mandated a complete defense in cases involving 
general liability insurance policies, which “typically promise 
to defend the insured in ‘a suit’ or ‘any suit’ seeking damages 
for acts, omissions, or occurrences covered by the policy.”  
Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 391, 
398 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).  Those policies refer to 
an entire case.  By contrast, title insurers promise to defend 
only the allegations that “flow from the ‘defect’ in the title.”  
Sec. Serv. Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 583 P.2d 1217, 
1225 (Wash. App. Ct. 1978).  As noted, the policy before us 
covers certain “causes of action” and not others, and therefore 
expressly contemplates Stewart Title’s partial defense of a 
lawsuit.   
The Massachusetts Supreme Court (considering a 
certified question) and the Seventh Circuit (predicting Illinois 
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law) have concluded that the “in for one, in for all” rule does 
not apply to title insurers.  They reasoned that the rule’s central 
principle—“parsing multiple claims is not feasible”—“is not 
implicated to the same extent in the title insurance context as 
in the general liability insurance context.” GMAC Mortgage, 
LLC, v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 985 N.E.2d 823, 831 (Mass. 
2013); see Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 771 F.3d at 398.  That 
reasoning is apt; title insurance is “fundamentally different” 
from general liability insurance because (1) the risk covered is 
limited, specific, and retrospective, (2) the premium is a 
relatively modest one-time charge, and (3) the duration of 
coverage is indefinite.  GMAC Mortgage, 985 N.E.2d at 828-
29.  To wit, “title issues are discrete, [and] they can be 
bifurcated fairly easily from related claims.”  Id. at 831.       
Brushing off the argument that “disastrous 
consequences” will follow if parties can contract around the 
“in for one, in for all” rule, the Seventh Circuit observed “that’s 
just the nature of title insurance; the premiums charged for this 
form of insurance reflect the limited scope of the coverage.”  
Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 771 F.3d at 394.  Expenses resulting 
from unexpected title defects comprise a small portion of title 
insurance premiums; the larger share is used to cover the 
expense of title research on the insured property.  See 11A 
Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 159:1 (3d ed. 1995).  
This system is efficient in our decentralized county-recordation 
title system.  “Given the remarkably high exposure represented 
by policy limits, title insurance premiums are remarkably low.”  
Id. 
We predict, for the same reasons, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would also create a title-policy exception to the 
“in for one, in for all” rule.  Given the unique title insurance 
context, by doing so it would “consider the language of the 
policy and the expectation of the insured so as to give 
reasonable meaning to its terms.” Rood v. Commw. Land Title 
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Ins. Co., 936 A.2d 488, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
As the issue is undecided by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, the District Court reasoned that it must apply the general 
rule that “a title insurance policy is subject to the same rules of 
construction that govern other insurance policies[.]” Lupu, 244 
F. Supp. 3d at 465 (quoting Rood, 936 A.2d at 491, which 
noted the rule is “general[]”).  But the lack of state-law 
authority creating an exception to the “in for one, in for all” 
rule does not compel us to define its scope by that general 
statement.  Federal courts, when sitting in diversity, are no 
ostriches.  We do and “often must engage in a substantial 
amount of conjecture.”  Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 
759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1985).  While Pennsylvania courts 
have not addressed this issue, the reasoning applied in out-of-
state cases is sufficient “persuasive data” to convince us of the 
direction they would go.  Meyer, 648 F.3d at 164.   
There is another reason pushing here opposite the “in 
for one, in for all” rule.  First, title policies are unambiguous 
that the parties bargained for partial coverage.  The industry-
standard language in the policy comes from the American Land 
Title Association, which revised the standard title policy form 
in 1987 to limit the insurer’s obligation “only as to those stated 
causes of action alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other 
matter insured against by this policy.”  Earlier model-policies 
used the term “litigation” instead of “cause of action.”  11A 
Plitt et al., Couch on Ins. § 159:1.  Given the relatively modest 
title insurance premium, if we force Stewart Title to cover 
more than it promised, Ocwen will receive a windfall. 
Second, the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance 
approved the “standard form of policy” before us, which is 
“used by all title underwriters in Pennsylvania.”  Lupu, 244 F. 
Supp. 3d at 465.  “No policy, endorsement or other coverage 
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may be issued which varies the terms, conditions, stipulations 
or exclusions of a policy unless first approved by [this] 
Department.”  Manual of the Title Insur. Rating Bureau of Pa. 
§ 2.7.  Ocwen argues that an executive agency cannot overwrite 
the common law, see Ocwen’s Br. at 31 n.11, but we are 
looking to the agency to see whether such a rule exists in the 
first place, not to overwrite a rule. 
D. Remand to determine which claims in the 
Fourth Amended Complaint are covered 
The District Court, because it applied the “in for one, in 
for all” rule, had no occasion to determine which of the claims 
in the Fourth Amended Complaint are within the scope of the 
Title Policy.  Though it may be but one claim, out of caution 
we remand to give the Court the opportunity to make the call, 
and in any event to determine the amount of legal fees and 
expenses Stewart Title is obligated to cover.     
IV. Conclusion 
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court tells us that an insurer’s 
duty to defend turns on the allegations within the four corners 
of a complaint matched against the terms of the insurance 
policy.  Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896.  We follow suit here in 
holding that Stewart Title’s duty to defend Ocwen against 
Lupu’s claims did not exist until the filing of the Fourth 
Amended Complaint.   
But is Stewart Title bound to defend the entire 
Complaint?  Its Title Policy states that it would not also defend 
non-covered claims in the action.  There was at least one 
covered claim in the litigation underlying this coverage 
dispute, and Stewart Title must defend it (or such other claims 
covered by the Title Policy).  Beyond that, however, we hold 
the parties to their bargain.   
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We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.   
